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INTERNATIONAL CRIMES:  JUS COGENS
AND OBLIGATIO ERGA OMNES
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
I
INTRODUCTION
International crimes that rise to the level of jus cogens constitute obligatio
erga omnes which are inderogable.  Legal obligations which arise from the
higher status of such crimes include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-
applicability of statutes of limitations for such crimes, the non-applicability of
any immunities up to and including Heads of State, the non-applicability of the
defense of “obedience to superior orders” (save as mitigation of sentence), the
universal application of these obligations whether in time of peace or war, their
non-derogation under “states of emergency,” and universal jurisdiction over
perpetrators of such crimes.
II
JUS COGENS AS A BINDING SOURCE OF LEGAL OBLIGATION IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain international crimes reach,
and obligatio erga omnes pertains to the legal implications arising out of a
certain crime’s characterization as jus cogens.  Thus, these two concepts are
different from each other.
International law has dealt with both concepts, but mostly in contexts that
do not include International Criminal Law (“ICL”).1  The national criminal law
of the world’s major legal systems and ICL doctrine have, however scantily,
dealt with each of the two concepts.2  Furthermore, the positions of publicists
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1. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27.  See also G.C. ROZANKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES (1976); ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATION ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(1996) (embodying the author’s doctoral dissertation, which is rich in public international law material
and mostly based on the work of the ILC, but poor on ICL).
2. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, DRAFT
CODE]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of International
Criminal Law, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 405 (1974); see, e.g., M. CHERIF
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BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Vols. I, II & III, 1986-1997 and 2d. rev. ed. 1997);
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
DOCUMENTS (Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 1996); ANDRE HUET & RENEE KOERING-JOULIN,
DROIT PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL (1994); M.CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1992); HAIDONG LI, DIE PRINZIPIEN DES INTERNATIONALEN
STRAFRECHTS (1991); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES DIGEST/INDEX (1985);
CLAUDE LOMBOIS, DROIT PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL (2d. rev. ed. 1979); MOHAMMED HASSANEIN
EBEID, AL-JARIMA AL- DAWLIA (1979); STEFAN GLASER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL
CONVENTIONNEL (Vol. 1 1971 & Vol. 2 1978); GUILLERMO J. FIERRO, LA LEY PÉNAL Y EL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (1977); BART DESCHUTTER, LA BELIGIQUE ET LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL (1975); 1 & 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973) [hereinafter 1 TREATISE]; DIETRICH OEHLER,
INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT (1973); A.H.J. SWART, INTERNATIONAAL STRAFRECHT (1973);
STANISLAW PLAWSKI, ÉTUDE DES PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL
(1972); AKTUELLE PROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS (Dietrich Oehler & Paul G.
Potz eds., 1970); OTTO TRIFFTERER, DOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES
MATERIELLEN VÖLKERSTRAFRECHTS SEIT NURNBERG (1966); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(G.O.W. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds., 1965); ANTONIO QUINTANO-RIPOLES, TRATADO DE
DERECHO PÉNAL INTERNACIONAL Y PÉNAL INTERNACIONAL PÉNAL (1957); STEFAN GLASER,
INFRACTIONS INTERNATIONALES (1957); GEORGE DAHM, ZUR PROBLEMTIK DES
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHTS (1956); STEFAN GLASER, INTRODUCTION A L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL (1954); HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER
STAATSORGANE NACH VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS (1952); JOSEPH B. KEENAN & BRENDAN F. BROWN,
CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950); NINO LEVI, DIRETTO PÉNALE INTERNAZIONALE
(1949); ALBERT DE LA PRADELLE, UNE REVOLUTION DANS LE DROIT PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL
(1946); ROLANDO QUADRI, DIRITTO PÉNALE INTERNAZIONALE (1944); FRANCESCO COSENTINI,
ESSAI D’UN CODE PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL DRESSÉ  SUR LA BASE COMPARATIVE DES PROJETS &
TEXTES RECENTS DES CODES PÉNAUX (1937); HELLMUTH VON WEBER, INTERNATIONALE
STRAFGERRICHTSBARKEIT (1934); CARLOS ALCORTA, PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO PÉNAL
INTERNACIONAL (1931); EMIL S. RAPPAPORT, LE PROBLÊME DU DROIT PÉNAL INTER ÉTATIQUE
(1930); HENRI DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES DU DROIT PÉNAL
INTERNATIONAL (1928); VESPASIAN V. PELLA, LA CRIMINALITÉ COLLECTIVE DES ÉTATS ET LE
DROIT PÉNAL DE L’AVENIR (1925); HENRI F. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, INTRODUCTION A L’ÉTUDE
DU DROIT PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL (1922); MAURICE TRAVERS, LE DROIT PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL
ET SA MISE EN OEUVRE EN TEMPS DE PAIX ET EN TEMPS DE GUERRE (1922); JOSEF KOHLER,
INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT (1917); SALVATORE ADINOLFI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
PENALE (1913); FRIEDRICH MEILI, LEHRBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS UND
STRAFPROZESSRECHTS (1910); see also, e.g., M.Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of
Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27 (1983); Robert Friedlander,
The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present Day Inquiry, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
13 (1983); Leslie C. Green, Is There an International Criminal Law?, 21 ALBERTA L. REV. 251 (1983);
Farooq Hassan, The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 39 (1983); G.O.W. Mueller, International Criminal Law: Civistas Maxima, 15 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 1 (1983); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in
the Process of International Protection of Human Rights, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 193 (1982);
Leslie C. Green, New Trends in International Criminal Law, 11 ISR. Y.B. H.R. 9 (1981); Hans-Heirich
Jescheck, Development, Present State and Future Prospects of International Criminal Law, 52 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 337 (1981); Leslie C. Green, International Crime and the Legal
Process, 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 567 (1980); Leslie C. Green, An International Criminal Code—Now?,
3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 560 (1976); Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 5 ISR. Y.B. H.R. 55
(1975); Quincy Wright, The Scope of International Criminal Law: A Conceptual Framework, 15 VA. J.
INT’L L. 561 (1975); M. Cherif Bassiouni, An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of
International Criminal Law, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 405 (1974); Robert
Legros, Droit Pénal International 1967, 48 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 259 (1968);
Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, État Actuel et Perspectives d’Avenir des Projets dans le Domaine du Droit
International Pénal, 35 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 83 (1964); W.J. Ganshof van der
Meersch, Justice et Droit International Pénal, 42 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 3
(1961); Leslie C. Green, New Approach to International Criminal Law, 28 SOLIC. 106 (1961); Jean Y.
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and penalists on this question diverge significantly.  The main divisions concern
how a given international crime achieves the status of jus cogens and the
manner in which such crimes satisfy the requirements of the “principles of
legality.”3
With respect to the consequences of recognizing an international crime as
jus cogens, the threshold question is whether such a status places obligations
erga omnes upon states or merely gives them certain rights to proceed against
perpetrators of such crimes.  This threshold question of whether obligatio erga
omnes carries with it the full implications of the Latin word obligatio, or
whether it is denatured in international law to signify only the existence of a
right rather than a binding legal obligation, has neither been resolved in
international law nor addressed by ICL doctrine.
To this writer, the implications of jus cogens are those of a duty and not of
optional rights; otherwise jus cogens would not constitute a peremptory norm
of international law.  Consequently, these obligations are non-derogable in
times of war as well as peace.4  Thus, recognizing certain international crimes as
jus cogens carries with it the duty to prosecute or extradite,5 the non-
                                                          
Dautricourt, Le Droit International Pénal, 37 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 243
(1957); Jacques Verhaegen, Les Impasses du Droit International Pénal, 38 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL
ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 3 (1957); Stefan Glaser, Element Moral de l’Infraction Internationale, 59 REVUE
GÉNÈRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 537 (1955); A.D. Belinfante, Les Princips de Droit
Pénal International et les Conventions Internationales, 2 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 243 (1955); Guiliano Vassalli, In tema di Diretto Internazionale Pénal, 56
GUISTIZIA PENALE 257 (1951); Stefan Glaser, Les Infractions Internationales et Leurs Sanctions, 29
REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 811 (1949); Henri F. Donnedieu de Vabres, La
Codification du Droit Pénal International, 19 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 21 (1948);
Stefan Glaser, Le Principe de la Legalité des Delits et des Peines et les Procès des Criminels de Guerre,
28 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 230 (1948); Henri F. Donnidieu de Vabres, Le
Procès de Nuremberg et le Principe de la Legalité et des Peines,  26 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL ET DE
CRIMINOLOGIE 813 (1947);  Henri F. Donnidieu de Vabres, Le Procès de Nuremberg Devant Les
Principes Modernes du Droit Pénal International, 7 RECUEIL DES COURS 481 (1947); Albert de La
Pradelle, Une Revolution Dans le Droit Pénal International, 13 NOUVELLE REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 360 (1946); Max Radin, International Crimes, 32 IOWA L. REV. 33 (1946);
Gerald Abrahams, Retribution: An Inquiry into the Possiblity of an International Criminal Law, 92
LAW J. 38, 45, 53 (1942); Roberto Ago, Le Delit International, 68 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 419 (1939); Henri F. Donnidieu de Vabres, La
Repression Internationale des Delits du Droit des Gens, 2 NOUVELLE REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 7 (1935); Vespasian P. Vella, Plan d’un Code Repressif Mondial, 12 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT PÉNAL 348 (1935); Carlos Alcorta, La Doctrina del Derecho Pénal
Internacional, 2 REVISITA ARGENTINA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 271 (1931); Guiseppe Sagone,
Pour un Droit Pénal International, 5 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PÉNAL 363 (1928);
Quintiliano Saldana, Projet de Code Pénal International, 1 CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT
PÉNAL (1926); G. Glover Alexander, International Criminal Law, 5 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 90
(1923); G. Glover Alexander, International Criminal Law, 3 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 237 (1921).
3. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 87
(1992).
4. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, States of Emergency and States of Exception: Human Rights
Abuses and Impunity under Color of Law, in NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS AND STATES OF EMERGENCY
125 (Daniel Prémont ed., 1996).
5. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE, THE DUTY
TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995).
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applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes,6 and universality of
jurisdiction7 over such crimes irrespective of where they were committed, by
whom (including Heads of State), against what category of victims, and
irrespective of the context of their occurrence (peace or war).  Above all, the
characterization of certain crimes as jus cogens places upon states the obligatio
erga omnes not to grant impunity to the violators of such crimes.8
Positive ICL does not contain such an explicit norm as to the effect of
characterizing a certain crime as part of jus cogens.  Furthermore, the practice
of states does not conform to the scholarly writings that espouse these views.
The practice of the states evidences that, more often than not, impunity has
been allowed for jus cogens crimes, the theory of universality has been far from
being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to prosecute or
extradite is more inchoate than established, other than when it arises out of
specific treaty obligations.
There is also much question as to whether the duty to prosecute or extradite
is in the disjunctive or in the conjunctive,9 which of the two has priority over the
other and under what circumstances, and, finally, whether implicit conditions of
effectiveness and fairness exist with respect to the duty to prosecute and with
respect to extradition leading to prosecution.10
The gap between legal expectations and legal reality is therefore quite wide.
It may be bridged by certain international pronouncements11 and scholarly
                                                          
6. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov. 11,
1970); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 1996).
7. See Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785
(1988); Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction over Atrocities in Rwanda: Theory and Practice, 1 EUR. J.
CRIME CR. L. CR. J. 18 (1996).
8. See, e.g., E.H. GUISSE & L. JOINET, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF IMPUNITY OF
PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Prevention and Protection of All Minorities, 45th Sess., Item 10(a), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6 (1993)(prepared pursuant to Sub-Commission Res. 1992/23); L. JOINET,
QUESTION OF THE IMPUNITY OF PERPETRATORS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS): FINAL REPORT, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 48th Session, Item 10, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (1996)(prepared pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1995/35); NAOMI
ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 14
(1995); RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); Stephen P.
Marks, Forgetting the Policies and Practices of the Past: Impunity in Cambodia, 17 FLETCHER  F. 18
(1994); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991); Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of
Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1995); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449,
475 n.137 (1990); Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 4 (1996); Robert O. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends
Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY’S L. J. 857, 867
(1995).
9. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE, ch.1 (3d ed. 1996).
10. See BASSIOUNI & WISE, supra note 5, at 8.
11. See, e.g., Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who have Committed
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29 at 88,
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writings,12 but the question remains whether such a bridge can be solid enough
to allow for the passage of these concepts from a desideratum to enforceable
legal obligations under ICL, creating state responsibility in case of non-
compliance.13
III
JUS COGENS CRIMES
The term “jus cogens” means “the compelling law” and, as such, a jus
cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other norms and
principles.14  As a consequence of that standing, jus cogens norms are deemed
to be “peremptory” and non-derogable.15
Scholars, however, disagree as to what constitutes a peremptory norm and
how a given norm rises to that level.  The basic reasons for this disagreement
are the significant differences in philosophical premises and methodologies of
the views of scholarly protagonists.  These differences apply to sources, content
(the positive or norm-creating elements), evidentiary elements (such as
whether universality is appropriate or less will suffice), and value-oriented
goals (for example, preservation of world order and safeguarding of
fundamental human rights).  Furthermore, there is no scholarly consensus on
the methods by which to ascertain the existence of a peremptory norm, nor to
assess its significance or determine its content.  Scholars also disagree as to the
means to identify the elements of a peremptory norm, to determine its priority
over other competing or conflicting norms or principles, to assess the
significance and outcomes of prior application, and to gauge its future
applicability in light of the value-oriented goals sought to be achieved.16
                                                          
U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
12. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW (1989); see also Claudia Annacker, The Legal Regime of “Erga Omnes” Obligations and
International Law, 46 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. INT’L L. 131 (1994); Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of
International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1986).
13. See IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1983).
14. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law”,
11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 801-09 (1990).
15. See, e.g., LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988).
16. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 512-15 (3d ed. 1979);
1 HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970); GEORGE
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 5 (1971); Gordon A. Christenson, Jus
Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1988); Karen
Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 411 (1989).  Other commentators have also noted that the function of peremptory
norms in the context of international law has not been adequately addressed:
Peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) have been the subject of much recent
interest.  In light of their extensive and quite unprecedented treatment by the International
Law Commission and the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, it may be surprising
that attention has not been greater.  At the same time, inquiry into the relationship between
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Some scholars see jus cogens sources and customary international law as the
same,17 others distinguish between them,18 while still others question whether
jus cogens is simply not another semantical way of describing certain “general
principles.”19  This situation adds to the level of uncertainty as to whether jus
cogens is a source of ICL.
The legal literature discloses that the following international crimes are jus
cogens: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy,
slavery and slave-related practices, and torture.  Sufficient legal basis exists to
reach the conclusion that all these crimes are part of jus cogens.20  This legal
basis consists of the following: (1) international pronouncements, or what can
be called international opinio juris, reflecting the recognition that these crimes
are deemed part of general customary law;21 (2) language in preambles or other
provisions of treaties applicable to these crimes which indicates these crimes’
higher status in international law;22 (3) the large number of states which have
ratified treaties related to these crimes;23 and (4) the ad hoc international
investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of these crimes.24
If a certain rigor is to apply, however, this legal basis cannot be examined in
a cumulative manner.  Instead, each one of these crimes must be examined
separately to determine whether it has risen to a level above that stemming
from specific treaty obligations, so that it can therefore be deemed part of
general international law applicable to all states irrespective of specific treaty
                                                          
peremptory norms and the sources and functions of international law have been virtually non-
existent.  This is indeed surprising, given the recent substantial interest in these areas as part
of a larger “theoretical explosion” in international legal studies.
N.G. Onuf & Richard K. Birney, Peremptory Norms of International Law: Their Source, Function and
Future, 4 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 187 (1973).
17. See ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1971).
18. See Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International
Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1988); cf. Mark Janis, Jus Cogens: An Artful Not a Scientific Reality, 3
CONN. J. INT’L L. 370 (1988).
19. See supra note 3.
20. The 1993 International Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia and the 1994 International
Tribunal for Rwanda statutes include the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th  Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) and the Statute for
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994), and address Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes.  The 1996 Code
of Crimes includes these three crimes plus Aggression.  See Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and
Security of Mankind: Titles and Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of
Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission on its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532 (1996), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532/Corr.1 and U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4l.532/Corr.3; Crimes Against U.N. Personnel, in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS  (1997 in print) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS].
21. See Michael Ackehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 1974 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 1.
22. See BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 20.
23. See id.
24. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda: The Need to Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 11 (1996) [hereinafter Bassiouni, From
Versailles to Rwanda).
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obligations.25  To pursue the approach suggested, it is also necessary to have a
doctrinal basis for determining what constitutes an international crime and
when in the historical legal evolution of a given crime it can be said to achieve
the status of jus cogens.26
As discussed below, certain crimes affect the interests of the world
community as a whole because they threaten the peace and security of
humankind and because they shock the conscience of humanity.27  If both
elements are present in a given crime, it can be concluded that it is part of jus
cogens.  The argument is less compelling, though still strong enough, if only one
of these two elements is present.28  Implicit in the first, and sometimes in the
second element, is the fact that the conduct in question is the product of state-
action or state-favoring policy.  Thus, essentially, a jus cogens crime is
characterized explicitly or implicitly by state policy or conduct, irrespective of
whether it is manifested by commission or omission. The derivation of jus
cogens crimes from state policy or action fundamentally distinguishes such
crimes from other international crimes.  Additionally, crimes which are not the
                                                          
25. For the proposition that some violations of the Geneva Conventions are jus cogens see
MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 9.  See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 95 (June 27)(concerning the applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties); BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 20, at 341-46. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties with annex, 23 May 1969, U.N. A/Conf. 39/27, specifies in Article 53 that a treaty
provision contrary to jus cogens is null and void.  Article 71, paragraph 1(a) makes it clear, however,
that the entire treaty is not null and void if the parties do not give effect to the provision in question.
The I.C.J. has also considered the question.  In U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24), the Court holds that some treaty obligations can also be “obligations
under general international law,” and in its advisory opinion on reservations to the Convention on
Genocide 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) it holds that the Genocide Convention is part of customary law.
26. In a tongue-in-cheek way, Professor Anthony D’Amato reflected the loose way in which jus
cogens is dealt with in international law in the title of his short essay It’s a Bird, it’s a Plane, it’s Jus
Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990).
27. Threats to peace and security are essentially political judgments, and the U.N. Charter gives
that function under Chapter VII to its primary political organ, the Security Council.  Thus it is difficult
to assess in objective legal terms what constitutes aggression.  See among the many writers on the
subject, YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGRESSION  AND SELF-DEFENSE (1988).  As to what is (or what is
not) shocking to the conscience of humanity, that too may be a subjective factor.  For example, a single
killing, coupled with the required intent to “destroy in whole or in part” required in Article II of the
Genocide Convention, is sufficient for that single act to be called genocide.  But the killing of an
estimated 2 million Cambodians is not genocide because it is not by one ethnic, religious, or national
group against another, but by the same national, religious, and ethnic group against its own members,
and for political reasons.  Since political and social groups are excluded from the protected groups in
the Genocide Convention, such massive killing is not deemed to be genocide, unless it can be factually
shown that there is a diversity between the perpetrator and victim groups.  Thus, one killing would be
genocide and consequently jus cogens, while 2 million killings would not.  Such mass killings do
however fall under crimes against humanity and war crimes, and are therefore jus cogens crimes under
other criminal labels.  See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3.
28. ICL doctrine has not however sufficiently dealt with the doctrinal bases of international
crimes, elements of international criminalization, and the criteria for their application to each and
every international crime.  This is evident in the writings of most ICL scholars.  See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note *; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristics of International
Criminal Law Conventions and International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 1 & 15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986); Daniel Derby, A Framework for
International Criminal Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 33 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1986).
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product of state action or state-favoring policy often lack the two essential
factors which establish the jus cogens status of a particular crime, namely a
threat to the peace and security of mankind and conduct or consequences
which are shocking to the conscience of humanity.
Each of these jus cogens crimes, however, does not necessarily reflect the
co-existence of all the elements.  Aggression is on its face a threat to peace and
security, but not all acts of aggression actually threaten the peace and security
of humankind.  While genocide and crimes against humanity shock mankind’s
conscience, specific instances of such actions may not threaten peace and
security.  Similarly, slavery and slave-related practices and torture also shock
the conscience of humanity, although they rarely threaten the peace and
security.  Piracy, almost non-existent nowadays,29 neither threatens peace and
security nor shocks the conscience of humanity, although it may have at one
time.30  War crimes may threaten peace and security; however, their
commission is only an aggravating circumstance of an already existing
condition of disruption of peace and security precisely because they occur
during an armed conflict, whether of an international or non-international
character.  Furthermore, the extent to which war crimes shock the conscience
of humanity may depend on the context of their occurrence and the
quantitative and qualitative nature of crimes committed.31
Three additional considerations must be taken into account in determining
whether a given international crime has reached the status of jus cogens.  The
first has to do with the historical legal evolution of the crime.  Clearly, the more
legal instruments that exist to evidence the condemnation and prohibition of a
particular crime, the better founded the proposition that the crime has risen to
the level of jus cogens.32  The second consideration is the number of states that
have incorporated the given proscription in their national laws.33  The third
consideration is the number of international and national prosecutions for the
given crime and how they have been characterized.34  Additional supporting
sources that can be relied upon in determining whether a particular crime is a
part of jus cogens is other evidence of general principles of law35 and the
                                                          
29. Except for the notable problem in the South Asia Seas.  See G.O.W. MUELLER & FREDA
ADLER, OUTLAWS OF THE OCEAN: THE COMPLETE BOOK OF CONTEMPORARY CRIME ON THE HIGH
SEAS (1985).
30. See Jacob Sundberg, The Crime of Piracy, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note *.
31. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554
(1995) (arguing that artificial legal distinctions between conflicts of an international and non-
international character should be eliminated, a position strongly supported by this writer; see M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI (IN COLLABORATION WITH PETER MANIKAS), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995)).  See also HOWARD LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR
CRIMES:  THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES (1993).
32. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS, supra note 20.
33. This is particularly true with respect to the military laws of 188 states that embody the
normative proscriptions and prescriptions of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949; 147 states
for Additional Protocol 2 and 139 for Additional Protocol II.  See BASSIOUNI, ICL CONVENTIONS,
supra note 20, at 252.
34. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 24.
35. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
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writings of the most distinguished publicists.36
The jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(“PCIJ”) and the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is also instructive in
determining the nature of a particular crime.  The ICJ, in its opinion in
Nicaragua v. United States: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua,37 relied on jus cogens as a fundamental principle of international
law.  However, that case also demonstrates the tenuous basis of using of legal
principles to resolve matters involving ideological or political issues or calling
for other value judgments.38  Earlier, the ICJ held that the prohibition against
genocide is a jus cogens norm that cannot be reserved or derogated from.39
As noted above, jus cogens leaves open differences of values, philosophies,
goals, and strategies of those who claim the existence of the norm in a given
situation and its applicability to a given legal issue.40  Thus, jus cogens poses two
essential problems for ICL; one relates to legal certainty and the other to a
norm’s conformity to the requirements of the principles of legality.  The
problem of normative positivism becomes more evident in the case of a void in
positive law in the face of an obvious and palpable injustice, such as with
respect to “crimes against humanity,” as enunciated in the Statute of the
International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) in the London Charter of August 8,
1945.41  The specific crimes defined in Article 6(c) of the London Charter fall
into the category of crimes which were not addressed by positive law, but
depended on other sources of law to support implicitly the formulation of a
crime.42  Proponents of natural law advocate that jus cogens is based on a higher
legal value to be observed by prosecuting offenders, while proponents of legal
                                                          
AND TRIBUNALS (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1953); BASSIOUNI, supra note 3.
36. II HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. XXI, §§ III, IV, in CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 526-29 (James B. Scott ed. & F. Kelsey trans., 1925); II EMMERICK DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
1916).
37. 1986 I.C.J. 14. See generally Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. United States
(Merits), 81 AM J. INT’L. L. 77 (1987).
38. See LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David
Scheffer eds., 1991).
39. See Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 1, 15 (May 28);
Convention on the  Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
40. One example in ICL is the non-applicability of the “defense of obedience to superior orders”
to a patently illegal order. But when is such order deemed illegal on its face and on what normative
basis?  See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF “OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS” IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); LESLIE  GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976); NICO KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978); EKKHART MULLER-
RAPPARD, L’ORDRE SUPERIEUR MILITAIRE ET LA RESPONSIBILITE PENALE DU SUBORDONNE
(1965); Leslie Green, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 1989 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 167.
41. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, London Charter, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
42. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 3; Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W.
INT’L. L.J. 201, 208-14 (1979).
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positivism argue that another principle whose values and goals are, at least in
principle, of that same dignity, namely the “principle of legality”—nullum
crimen sine lege—should prevail.43  A value-neutral approach is impossible;
thus, the only practical solution is the codification of ICL.44
IV  
OBLIGATIO ERGA OMNES
The erga omnes and jus cogens concepts are often presented as two sides of
the same coin.  The term erga omnes means “flowing to all,” and so obligations
deriving from jus cogens are presumably erga omnes.45  Indeed, legal logic
supports the proposition that what is “compelling law” must necessarily
engender an obligation “flowing to all.”
The problem with such a simplistic formulation is that it is circular.  What
“flows to all” is “compelling,” and if what is “compelling” “flows to all,” it is
difficult to distinguish between what constitutes a “general principle” creating
an obligation so self-evident as to be “compelling” and so “compelling” as to be
“flowing to all,” that is, binding on all states.46
In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ stated,
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in
the field of diplomatic protection.  By their very nature the former are the concern of
all States.  In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.47
Thus, the first criterion of an obligation rising to the level of erga omnes is, in
the words of the ICJ, “the obligations of a state towards the international
Community as a whole.”48  While the ICJ goes on to give examples of such
                                                          
43. See Bassiouni, supra note 3, ch. 2.
44. See  BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE, supra note 2; see also Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 20; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The History of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note *.
45. See Randall, supra  note 7, at 829-30 (1988); Reydams, supra note 7.
46. In an important study bearing on the erga omnes and jus cogens relationship, Professor
Randall notes that “traditionally international law functionally has distinguished the erga omnes and
jus cogens doctrines.”  Randall, supra note 7, at 830.  However, he, too, seems to accept the sine qua
non relatively.
Jus cogens means compelling law.  [The jus cogens concept refers to] peremptory principles or
norms from which no derogation is permitted, and which may therefore operate to invalidate
a treaty or agreement between States to the extent of the inconsistency with any such
principles or norms.  Id.
While authoritative lists of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms do not exist, any
such list likely would include the norms against hijacking, hostage taking, crimes against
internationally protected persons, apartheid, and torture.  Traditionally, international law
functionally has distinguished the erga omnes and jus cogens doctrines, which addresses
violations of individual responsibility.  These doctrines nevertheless, may subsidiarily support
the right of all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over the individual offenders.  One
might argue that “when committed by individuals,” violations of erga omnes obligations and
peremptory norms “may be punishable by any State under the universality principle.” Id.
47. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
48. Id.
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obligations in Barcelona Traction,49 it does not define precisely what meaning it
attaches to the phrase “obligations of a state towards the international
community as a whole.”50
The relationship between jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes was never
clearly articulated by the PCIJ and the ICJ, nor did the jurisprudence of either
court explicitly articulate how a given norm becomes jus cogens, or why and
when it becomes erga omnes and what consequences derive from this.
Obviously, a jus cogens norm rises to that level when the principle it embodies
has been universally accepted, through consistent practice accompanied by the
necessary opinio juris, by most states.51  Thus, the principle of territorial
sovereignty has risen to the level of a “peremptory norm” because all states
have consented to the right of states to exercise exclusive territorial
jurisdiction.52
Erga omnes, as stated above, however, is a consequence of a given
international crime having risen to the level of jus cogens.53  It is not, therefore,
a cause of or a condition for a crime’s inclusion in the category of jus cogens.
The contemporary genesis of the concept obligatio erga omnes for jus
cogens crimes is found in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.54  The concept also
finds support both in the ICJ’s South West Africa cases55 as well as from the
Barcelona Traction56 case.  However, it should be noted that the South West
Africa cases dealt inter alia with human rights violations and not with
                                                          
49. Id.  The court further stated in the ensuing paragraph:
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination.  Some of the corresponding rights of protection
have entered into the body of general international law (Reservations to the
Convention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a
universal or quasi-universal character.
50. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32.
51. In Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 123, 135 (Apr. 12)
(Fernandes, J. dissenting), Judge Fernandes states:
It is true that in principle special rules will prevail over general rules, but to take it
as established that in the present case the particular rule is different from the
general rule is to beg the question.  Moreover, there are exceptions to this
principle.  Several rules cogestes prevail over any special rules.  And the general
principles to which I shall refer later constitute true rule of jus cogens over which
no special practice can prevail.
See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 66 (June 21) (Fernandes, J.,
dissenting).
52. See S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
53. MERON,  supra note 12, at 188-97.
54. 1951 ICJ REP. 15 (May 28); see Gordon Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens, 81 AM.
J. INT’L L. 93 (1987).
55. (Preliminary Objections) (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 1963 ICJ REP.
319 (Dec. 21); see Christenson, supra note 54.
56. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); see
Christenson, supra note 54.
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international crimes stricto sensu57 and that the Barcelona Traction case
concerned an issue of civil law.
It is still uncertain in ICL whether the inclusion of a crime in the category of
jus cogens creates rights or, as stated above, non-derogable duties erga omnes.
The establishment of a permanent international criminal court having inherent
jurisdiction over these crimes would be a convincing argument for the
proposition that crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes are part of jus cogens and that obligations erga omnes to prosecute or
extradite flow from them.58
V
CONCLUSION
There are both gaps and weaknesses in the various sources of ICL norms
and enforcement modalities.  The work of the ILC in formulating the 1996
Draft Code of Crimes is insufficient.  A comprehensive international
codification would obviate these problems, but this is not forthcoming.
Existing state practices are also few and far between and are insufficient to
establish a solid legal basis to argue that the obligations deriving from jus
cogens crimes are in fact carried out as established by law, or at least as
perceived in the writings of progressive jurists.  Thus, it is important to
motivate governments to incorporate the obligations described into their
national laws as well as to urge their expanded use in the practice of states.
Jurists have, therefore, an important task in advancing the application of these
ICL norms, which are an indispensable element in the protection of human
rights and in the preservation of peace.
                                                          
57. Lech Gardocki, Report, Les Crimes Internationaux et le Droit Pénal Interne, 60 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 91 (1989); Otto Triffterer, Report, Les Crimes Internationaux et le
Droit Pénal Interne, 60 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 31 (1989).
58. On the establishment of the permanent international criminal court, see Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR 51st
Sess., Supp No. 22, U.N. Doc A/51/22 (1996); 13 NOUVELLES ÉTUDES PÉNALES (1997).
